America allows greater numbers of immigrants than any other country. However, the annual flow of immigrants as a percent of our population is below most other OECD countries because the United States has such a large population. The percentage of our population that is foreign-born is about America is great at assimilating immigrants but other countries are much more open to legal immigration. For a law to be consistent with the principle of the Rule of Law, it must be applied equally, have roughly ex ante predictable outcomes based on the circumstances, and be consistent with our Anglo-Saxon traditions of personal autonomy and liberty.
Our current immigration laws violate all of those principles. For the Rule of Law to be present, good laws are required, not just strict adherence to government enforcement of bad laws. An amnesty is an admission that our past laws have failed, they need reform, and that the net cost of enforcing them in the meantime exceeds the benefits. That is why there have been numerous immigration amnesties throughout American history. Enforcing laws that are inherently capricious and that are contrary to our traditions is inconsistent with a stable Rule of Law, which is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for economic growth.
Enforcing bad laws poorly is better than enforcing bad laws uniformly despite the uncertainty. In immigration, poor enforcement of our destructive laws is preferable to strict enforcement but liberalization is the best option.
Admitting our laws failed, granting an amnesty for lawbreakers, and reforming the law would not doom the Rule of Law in the United States—it would strengthen it. By not exercising control over borders through actively blocking immigrants, the users of this argument warn, the United States government will surrender a vital component of its national sovereignty. Rarely do users of this argument explain to whom the U. How can that be?
The standard Weberian definition of a government is an institution that has a monopoly or near monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a certain geographical area.
It achieves this monopoly by keeping out other competing sovereigns. Our government maintains its sovereignty by excluding the militaries of other nations, by stopping insurgents, and interrupting the plans of terrorists. However, U. The main effect of our immigration laws is to prevent willing foreign workers from selling their labor to voluntary American purchasers. If the United States would return to its immigration policy then foreign militaries crossing U.
Allowing the free flow of non-violent and healthy foreign nationals does nothing to diminish the U. There is also a historical argument that free immigration and national sovereignty are not in conflict. From the federal government placed almost no restrictions on immigration. At the time, states imposed restrictions on the immigration of free blacks and likely indigents through outright bars, taxes, passenger regulations, and bonds.
States did not enforce many of those restrictions and the Supreme Court struck down the rest of them in the s. However, that open immigration policy did not stop the United States from fighting three major wars: the War of , the Mexican American War, and the Civil War. The U. Those who claim the U. To argue that open borders would destroy American sovereignty is to argue that the United States was not a sovereign country when George Washington, Andrew Jackson, or Abraham Lincoln were presidents.
We do not have to choose between free immigration and U. Furthermore, national sovereign control over immigration means that the government can do whatever it wants with that power—including relinquishing it entirely. It would be odd to argue that sovereign national states have complete control over their border except they that cannot open them too much. Of course they can, as that is the essence of sovereignty.
After all, I am arguing that the United States government should change its laws to allow for more legal immigration, not that the U.
This is an argument used by some Republicans and conservatives to oppose liberalized immigration. They point to my home state of California as an example of what happens when there are too many immigrants and their descendants: Democratic Party dominance. They would further have to explain why Texas Hispanics are so much more Republican than those in California are. Nativism has never been the path toward national party success and frequently contributes to their downfall. In other words, whether immigrants vote for Republicans is mostly up to how Republicans treat them.
Republicans should look toward the inclusive and relatively pro-immigration policies and positions adopted by their fellow party members in Texas and their subsequent electoral success there rather than trying to replicate the foolish nativist politics pursued by the California Republican Party.
Although some Texas Republicans have changed their tone on immigration in recent years, they have focused primarily on border security rather than forcing every state employee to help enforce immigration law. My comment here assumes that locking people out of the United States because they might disproportionately vote for one of the two major parties is a legitimate use of government power—I do not believe that it is. The resultant weakening in economic growth means that immigrants will destroy more wealth than they will create over the long run.
This is the most intelligent anti-immigration argument and the one most likely to be correct although the evidence does not support it. Economists Michael Clemens and Lant Pritchett lay out an enlightening model of how immigrants from poorer countries could theoretically weaken the growth potential of the countries that they immigrate to. Their model assumes that immigrants transmit anti-growth factors to the United States in the form of lower total factor productivity.
However, as the immigrants assimilate, these anti-growth factors weaken over time. The global economic crisis and rising unemployment have further aggravated these trends.
Addressing negative perceptions of migrants within host communities is therefore a key element of promoting their integration and enhancing their contribution to development. Various international instruments, and in particular, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families , address the issue of discrimination and provide guidance on human rights safeguards.
Special Procedures, treaty bodies and the Universal Periodic Review mechanism have also addressed these issues. Combating Discrimination against Migrants - Feature stories. A special focus on discrimination.
Discrimination against indigenous peoples. Discrimination against migrants. It organizes the public into nine distinct groups, based on an analysis of their attitudes and values. Even in a polarized era, the survey reveals deep divisions in both partisan coalitions.
Use this tool to compare the groups on some key topics and their demographics. Pew Research Center now uses as the last birth year for Millennials in our work.
President Michael Dimock explains why. About Pew Research Center Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world.
It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts. Newsletters Donate My Account. Research Topics. You are reading page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5. Many Nigerians, Tunisians and Kenyans say they plan to leave their countries in the next five years. Majority of U. Public Supports High-Skilled Immigration. Many worldwide oppose more migration u both into and out of their countries.
Immigration concerns fall in Western Europe, but most see need for newcomers to integrate into society. Sub-Saharan African Immigrants in the U. Follow Us. Analyses of differences between the UK and other nations, controlling GDP per capita and year of survey, are shown in Table 5 , and compared to our previous analysis. Table 5. Sensitivity tests: 1 Different measure of discrimination, same data set; 2 yet another measure of discrimination and an entirely different dataset.
The UK is not distinctive in any of these alternative analyses row 1, highlighted. The results are from multilevel regressions, specifically variance-components models with individual-level fixed effects and random intercepts, estimated by GLS. These replications also suggest that the pattern of prejudice declining with socioeconomic development may be rather general—it is statistically significant in both replications—but of varying magnitude.
In Sensitivity Test 1, the decline is much larger than in our main model, but in Sensitivity Test 2 it is still significant, but smaller in magnitude. The crucial point for present purposes is that the UK closely resembles peer countries in the EU using different questions and different datasets. That inspires confidence that the resemblance is real. Furthermore, we included the percent of immigrants as a country-level variable in the model.
In a multilevel analysis estimated, like the previous models in STATA's xtreg via GLS with fixed effects and random intercepts of the 48 countries with available data, with 64, individual cases. Including this higher-level variable did not change the GDP effects. This is not necessarily strong evidence against the Contact Hypothesis: 1 contact may reduce prejudice as much prior research suggests Hewstone and Swart, , but status threat effects Davidov and Semyonov, may also be present at the same time and they may cancel each other out; 2 the national percent of immigrants is, at best, a weak indicator of contact, because residential and social segregation may severely restrict social interaction.
Moreover, British prejudice levels are just where they would be expected to be based on the general pattern of prejudice and socioeconomic development within the EU. They are also generally close to the other Anglophone countries. But it cannot be taken for granted that these largely benign attitudes toward foreign workers will persist or even improve.
In some places, net of development, prejudice appears to be decreasing, in others holding steady, and in others increasing. There is no obvious pattern. Another issue is the explicit desire to discriminate against foreign workers in hiring and employment. If this were an important impediment to collaboration between the UK and the EU, we would expect that the desire to discriminate is stronger in the UK than elsewhere.
But in fact, there is nothing exceptional about the UK in this Sensitivity Test 1. Nor does the UK show any unusual preference for restricting immigration Sensitivity Test 2. H1: Prejudices against all religious and ethnic outgroups all reflect a single latent ethno-religious prejudice variable. H2: Ethno-religious prejudice is distinct from prejudices against other outgroups.
H3: Socioeconomic development has a positive, albeit not hugely strong effect increasing ethno-religious tolerance. H4: The UK is not distinctive in ethno-religious prejudice, net of socioeconomic development and social composition individual characteristics. This similarity to the general EU pattern suggests that public opinion in the UK about foreign workers is no more of an obstacle to a common market than is true for other European countries.
Thus, if it was one cause of Brexit as is likely , it is a cause that could apply equally to many other EU nations in future years. The relatively low levels of prejudice in most of the EU for this whole period are not grounds for complacency. An in-depth study in the Netherlands suggests that exposure to immigrants may have a u-shaped concave up quadratic; down, then up effect on prejudice Havekes et al.
Perhaps the presence of immigrants has strong ambivalent effects, with increasing availability of immigrants as interaction partners reducing prejudice and, at the same time, status threat increasing prejudice Davidov and Semyonov, : The balance between the two effects may be unstable and could tilt suddenly.
However, ethno-religious prejudice does not translate directly into party politics not only because it is only one issue among many, but also because all the parties seem to have slightly shifted in an anti-immigrant direction which seems to have preserved adherence to the major parties among mildly prejudiced people Wagner and Meyer, The finding that ethno-religious prejudice is really one attitude with many symptoms suggests important possibilities for beneficial and harmful effects on social cohesion and harmony in the future.
In particular, in a kind of extended version of the Contact Hypothesis Allport, [] ; Pettigrew and Tropp, ; Hewstone and Swart, positive contact with a member of one minority group is likely to erode prejudice against members of all ethno-religious minority groups Moreover, this finding, in conjunction with knowledge of the availability heuristic Tversky and Kahneman, suggests that terrorist attacks against the majority population by members of any such group would be likely to stimulate prejudice against all potential outgroups in the ethno-religious domain.
Moreover, the result that anti-immigrant feeling is really not a separate thing, but rather a symptom of a latent ethno-religious prejudice against a wide variety of such groups reinforces the emerging understanding that issues of framing, national identity, values for cultural distinctiveness, and nonlinear cultural trends play an important role influencing prejudice levels now and possibly an even more important role shaping future trends in prejudice in the advanced societies Davidov and Semyonov, Of course, even though simple issues of status threat seem to be less important than originally thought Kuntz et al.
The key issue may be the degree to which status as a good and valuable person requires adherence to specific cultural practices: If these are required, that puts such status within the reach of locals even with few economic and cognitive resources; if they are not required—as potentially evidenced by elite tolerance of ethno-religious outgroups or economic success of these outgroups—access to status as a good and valuable person is potentially harder to achieve for locals with few economic and cognitive resources.
Further grounds for concern are that terrorist attacks of recent years, in addition to their immediate and direct harm, may impair generalized social trust. That matters to the future of European cooperation because social trust influences prejudice Rustenbach, Also, to the extent that such incidents are associated in the public mind with any ethnic and or religious group and stimulate prejudice against that group, this could ramify into increased ethno-religious prejudice across the board.
On the other hand, ongoing socioeconomic development and advancing educational attainment are likely to reduce prejudice against all potential outgroups in the ethno-religious domain to the extent that the observed relationships are causal, which is plausible but beyond the scope of the present paper to establish. We have discussed socioeconomic development as indexed by GDP in terms of a Maslowian interpretation see also Inglehart and Welzel, , but it is also possible that socioeconomic development may enhance tolerance of ethno-religious outgroups by attracting migrants to the country and thereby increasing positive contact and reducing prejudice against all ethno-religious minorities.
All in all, prejudice and willingness to discriminate against foreign workers are relatively low. They are rising in some European nations—despite a countervailing trend of tolerance increasing with GDP—but not in others. In this, the UK is unexceptional, except perhaps that prejudice against Muslims may be a little lower than in peer countries in the EU. This strongly suggests that Brexit did not come about because the UK's population is distinctively prejudiced and that similar issues may well-arise in other EU nations in future years.
The links to right-wing populist politics will continue to demand researchers' attention. The datasets analyzed in this study can be found at www. ME and JK wrote and argued over every part of this paper. It is part of a collaboration on analysis of immigrant issues extending over 35 years. Their contributions are indistinguishable.
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. For comparability GDP is also omitted for the EU nations; multilevel estimates including it are almost identical save perhaps for a fractionally sharper upturn in prejudice in recent years.
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